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Abstract
Using an eﬃciency-wage model, we examine the relationship between indeterminacy and
unemployment insurance. It is shown that the less unemployment insurance is, the more
likely equilibrium is to be indeterminate. Equilibrium can be indeterminate even without
externalities or increasing returns, which makes a sharp contrast to the recent literature on
indeterminacy. Our result is based on the fact that the no-shirking condition with marginal
utility ofwealth kept constant is downward sloping when income insurance is not perf ect.
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11 Introduction
In the last decade or so, there has been a growing body ofresearch on indeterminacy in dynamic
general equilibrium models.1 In the context ofmacroeconomics, the existence ofa continuum
of equilibria raises the possibility that the economy ﬂuctuates purely driven by self-fulﬁlling
expectations and may justify the “animal spirit hypothesis” of business cycles. In their seminal
work, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) have obtained indeterminacy in a one-sector neoclassical
growth model with externalities. For this, they require that externalities be so large that the
labor demand curve is upward sloping and steeper than the labor supply curve. The major
criticism against their work has been that the amount ofexternalities required f or indeterminacy
is too large. Since then, a lot ofresearch has made a progress to modif y the model ofBenhabib
and Farmer (1994) to obtain indeterminacy with a lower amount ofexternalities. Examples
include, among others, the model with sector-speciﬁc externalities by Benhabib and Farmer
(1996); the model with home production by Perli (1996); the two-sector model by Benhabib
and Nishimura (1998); the model with variable capital utilization by Wen (1998); the monetary
model with borrowing constraint by Barinci and Ch´ eron (2001).
Here, we take a diﬀerent approach by looking at a source ofindeterminacy diﬀerent f rom
externalities, that is, limited risk sharing between the employed and the unemployed. Speciﬁ-
cally, we consider a version ofthe eﬃciency wage model ofAlexopoulos (2002). The model is
similar to the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model except that a worker’s eﬀort is not
perfectly observable by ﬁrms. The wage rate should, therefore, be set to prevent workers from
shirking. Given the wage rate set in such a way, ﬁrms hire workers according to their labor
demand, which generates unemployment in equilibrium. With full income insurance, the model
reduces to that ofthe standard growth model with utility linear in leisure, and the result of
Behnabib and Farmer (1994) applies. With partial income insurance, however, the model can
generate indeterminacy even without externalities.
To see why indeterminacy is possible in our model without externalities, it is useful to look at
the labor market equilibrium, as illustrated by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and others. There,
the relevant labor supply curve is the one with constant marginal utility ofwealth (the “Frisch
labor supply curve”). In the standard model where the steady state is a saddle point, the labor
demand curve slopes down and the Frisch labor supply curve slopes up; an increase in marginal
utility ofwealth shif ts down the Frisch labor supply curve, and increases labor input and output.
In the model ofBenhabib and Farmer (1994), ifthe labor demand curve is upward sloping and
1A useful survey on this area of research is given by Benhabib and Farmer (1999).
2steeper than the labor supply curve, higher marginal utility ofwealth reduces labor and output
by shifting down the labor supply curve. This non-standard feature of the labor market is the
key for indeterminacy in their model. Also, in the two-sector model of Benhabib and Farmer
(1996), ifsector-speciﬁc externalities are large enough, higher marginal utility ofwealth shif ts
up the Frisch labor supply curve, resulting in a decrease in labor input and output, even when
the labor demand curve is downward sloping.
The mechanism that generates indeterminacy in our model is also understood by looking at
the labor market equilibrium. As is well known (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), in an eﬃciency wage
model the labor market equilibrium is described by the incentive-compatibility condition (or “no-
shirking condition”) in place ofthe labor supply curve. The relevant no-shirking condition in
our dynamic model is the one with constant marginal utility ofwealth, which is ref erred to as
the “Frisch NSC.” With full income insurance, the Frisch NSC is horizontal, which makes the
model equivalent to the standard model with utility linear in leisure, leading to determinacy
with constant-returns technology. When income insurance is only partial, however, the Frisch
NSC becomes downward sloping. This is because when the level ofconsumption diﬀers between
the employed and the unemployed, an increase in employment tends to reduce the average level
ofmarginal utility ofconsumption, because marginal utility ofconsumption ofthe employed is
lower. Ifmarginal utility ofwealth is kept constant, this tends to reduce the average amount of
consumption, which, in turn, tends to reduce the incentive-compatible wage rate. It is also shown
that the Frisch NSC gets steeper with less unemployment beneﬁts, thus with higher inequality in
consumption between the employed and the unemployed. This is because the eﬀect ofa change
in employment on the average marginal utility ofconsumption is greater with less unemployment
beneﬁt. Thus, for a suﬃciently low level of unemployment beneﬁts, the Frisch NSC is steeper
than the labor demand curve. In such a case, higher marginal utility ofwealth is associated
with lower labor input and output, even when the labor demand curve slopes down. This is the
mechanism that generates indeterminacy in our model.2
Our analysis shows that indeterminacy is more likely to occur ifthere is more inequality in
consumption between the employed and the unemployed. In our calibration exercise, indetermi-
nacy occurs with constant returns technology ifthe consumption ofthe unemployed is less than
2Our work is closely related to Bennett and Farmer (2000), who have emphasized the potential importance
of a downward sloping Frisch labor supply curve to generate indeterminacy. As shown by Hintermaier (2003)
and Nakajima (2001), however, as long as utility is concave between consumption and leisure, the Frisch labor
supply curve cannot slope down. Here, the Frisch NSC is downward sloping in spite of the concavity of the utility
function.
375 percent ofthat ofthe employed. This seems to be a quite plausible number. For example,
based on the evidence ofGruber (1997), Alexopoulos (2002) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2000) set this value to 78 percent in their quantitative analysis ofthe related model.
The rest ofthe paper is organized as f ollows. Section 2 describes the economy. The case of
full income insurance is analyzed in Section 3. The case of partial income insurance is in Section
4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Description of the Economy
The economy considered in this paper is a version ofthe eﬃciency wage model ofAlexopoulos
(2002). It is similar to the one-sector neoclassical growth model except that a worker’s eﬀort is
imperfectly observable by ﬁrms. Firms set the wage rate so that prevents workers from shirking
on the job. Given the wage rate set in such a way, the number ofemployed workers is determined
according to the demand for labor, which generates unemployment in equilibrium.
2.1 Households
The representative household consists ofa unit-measure continuum ofindividuals. As shown
below, household members diﬀer in the level ofconsumption, which depends on their employment
status. To maintain the representative-agent framework, we follow Alexopoulos (2002) to assume
that the household owns the stock ofcapital and makes all capital (saving) related decisions.
Individuals are not allowed to borrow or save: they simply consume their income at each point
in time.
2.1.1 Capital accumulation
Let Kt be the stock ofcapital owned by the household at time t. It evolves over time as
˙ Kt = It − δKt, (1)
where It is investment at time t, and δ is the depreciation rate.
At each point in time, the household rents capital to ﬁrms at the rate Rt. The rental income
net ofinvestment, RtKt − It, is distributed equally to each household member, which is the
minimum level ofincome guaranteed regardless oftheir employment status or unemployment
beneﬁts. Let Ch
t denote this amount:
Ch
t ≡ RtKt − It. (2)
42.1.2 Unemployment insurance
At each point in time, household members are diﬀerent in the following respects. First, they are
either employed or unemployed. Second, employed individuals may or may not shirk. Third,
shirkers may or may not be caught. At each point in time, randomly picked Nt members ofthe
household receive job oﬀers (as we shall see below, no one will turn down the job oﬀer).
To share the risk of unemployment, the household organizes a fully funded unemployment
insurance program for its members.3 Let Ft be the transfer that employed individuals make for
the unemployed. The total amount ofthe f und, NtFt, is distributed equally among (eligible)
unemployed members.
Depending on the size ofunemployment beneﬁts, unemployment is either voluntary or in-
voluntary. Ifunemployment beneﬁts are large, an unemployed individual’s utility can be higher
than that ofan employed (non-shirking) individual, and unemployment is voluntary. This is
the case, for example, when the income insurance is full, that is, when unemployed individuals
receive the same income as employed (non-shirking) individuals. In such a case, we need a mech-
anism that prevents individuals from turning down a job oﬀer. For that purpose, we assume that
the household observes which members receive job oﬀers and that individuals rejecting oﬀers
are not eligible for unemployment beneﬁts. With this mechanism, we shall ignore the possibility
ofjob oﬀers’ being turned down in what f ollows.
2.1.3 Individuals
Each employed individual works for a ﬁxed number of hours, h. Firms oﬀer a contract that
speciﬁes the required eﬀort level, et and a wage rate Wt. It also stipulates that ifa worker is
caught shirking his wage rate will go down to sWt, where s ∈ (0,1) is an exogenous parameter.
A shirker is caught with probability d ∈ (0,1).
Let Ct be the consumption ofan employed individual who does not shirk:
Ct = Ch
t + hWt − Ft. (3)
The consumption ofan employed individual who shirks but does not get caught is also given by





t + shWt − Ft. (4)
3It is straightforward to reformulate the model so that the unemployment insurance program is provided by
the government rather than the household.








We assume that the intra-household transfer, Ft, is determined by
Ft = σ(1 − Nt)hWt, (6)
where σ ∈ [0,1] is the exogenous parameter that measures the degree ofincome insurance. For










Thus, Ct = Cu
















t + σNthWt. (9)
In this case, Cu
t <C t, and, for a suﬃciently small σ, unemployment becomes involuntary.
Alexopoulos (2002) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2000) consider the particular case
ofpartial income insurance, in which σ = s. When σ = s, Cu
t = Cs
t, and the unemployed and
the detected shirkers get the same utility.




ln(C)+θln(T − ξ − he), if e>0,
ln(C)+θln(T), if e =0 ,
(10)
where θ>0, T is the time endowment, and ξ is the ﬁxed cost ofexerting nonzero eﬀort. 4
An employed non-shirker obtains instantaneous utility of U(Ct,e t). It is clear that any shirker
chooses e = 0, so that a shirker’s expected utility is (1−d)U(Ct,0)+dU(Cs
t,0). An unemployed
worker’s utility ﬂow is U(Cu
t ,0).




(T − ξ − he)
1−γ,
does not aﬀect our result on indeterminacy at all.
62.1.4 The household’s problem
Let Ns
t be the number ofemployed individuals who shirk at time t. The household takes
{Rt,W t,N t,Ns
t } as given, and chooses {Ch
















subject to (1), (2), and (7)-(9).
2.2 Firms
















When η = 0 there are no externalities. As we shall see below, when η = 0, equilibrium is
determinate under full insurance, but it can be indeterminate if insurance is only partial.
2.2.1 Proﬁt maximization
It is not proﬁtable for ﬁrms to allow worker to shirk, so that they oﬀer a contract to make
Ns





t (hetNt)1−α − hWtNt − RtKt

,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:5
U(Ct,e t) ≥ (1 − d)U(Ct,0) + dU(Cs
t,0), (12)
where U(C,e) is as deﬁned in (10), and Ct and Cs
t are given in (3)-(4). In (3)-(4), ﬁrms take
Ch
t and Ft as given.
5Remember that no individual will turn down the job oﬀer. In other words, the individual rationality constraint
is satisﬁed. In addition, it is non-binding.
7The incentive compatibility constraint (12) will bind in the ﬁrms’ problem, so that we can















Note that since the ﬁrm takes Ft and Ch
t as given, it views Ct/Cs










Hence, we write the right-hand side of(13) as a f unction of Wt: e(Wt;Ch
t ,F t).
Given the incentive compatibility constraint et = e(Wt;Ch













Here, the ﬁrst equation is the Solow condition that implies the ﬁrm chooses the wage rate to
minimize the cost per unit eﬀort (Solow, 1979). It implies that the ﬁrm sets the wage rate Wt
so that the consumption ratio, Ct/Cs




= χ, all t,
where the constant χ ≥ 1 is implicitly deﬁned by
Td(1 − sχ)(χ − 1) = θ(1 − s)
	











ξ>0, and (T − ξ)s−1− d
θ − Ts−1 > 0,
which guarantees a unique solution χ ∈ (1,s −1) in (16).
Since Ct/Cs









6This is true for a larger class of utility functions than considered here. For example, any utility function of
the form U(C,e)=( 1 /(1 − σ))[C(T − ξ − he)
θ]
1−σ,o rU(C,e) = ln(C)+V (T − ξ − he) has this property.
82.2.2 No shirking condition
As is well known, in an eﬃciency wage model the labor market equilibrium is described by
using the “no shirking condition” in place ofthe labor supply curve (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
A corresponding condition in our model is derived from the incentive compatibility condition,
Ct/Cs
t = χ.
Using (7)-(8), the incentive-compatibility condition, Ct/Cs
t = χ, is rewritten as
hWt =
χ − 1
1 − sχ + σ(χ − 1)(1 − Nt)
Ch
t , (17)
which is referred to as the no-shirking condition. It implies an upward relationship between the
wage rate Wt and the employment Nt given Ch
t . This is an intuitive relationship: keeping the
common income, Ch
t , ﬁxed, a higher wage rate is needed to induce more individuals to work
without shirking. The no shirking condition (17) plays the same role as the labor supply function
does in the standard growth model.
Using equations (7), (9) and (17), the ratio ofthe consumption ofthe (non-shirking) employed






1 − sχ + σ(χ − 1)
. (18)
In the calibration exercise below, µ plays an important role. Note that when σ =1 ,µ = 1, and
when σ = s, µ = χ.
2.2.3 Resource Constraint
Since no individuals shirk in equilibrium, the economy-wide resource constraint at time t is given
by
NtCt +( 1− Nt)Cu
t + It = Yt, (19)
where output, Yt,i s
Yt = Ka
t (ehNt)b, (20)
with a = α(1 + η) and b =( 1− α)(1 + η).
3 Equilibrium
Let us now discribe an equilibrium ofthe economy. We restrict our attention to an interior
solution: Nt ∈ (0,1), all t.
93.1 Full Insurance
We start with the full insurance case, σ = 1, and show that the model is equivalent to the
standard growth model with utility linear in leisure. Thus, equilibrium is (locally) determinate
as long as the labor demand curve is downward sloping: b<1.7









˙ Kt = It − δKt, (22)
˙ Λt =( ρ + δ)Λt − RtΛt. (23)




The transversality condition is limt→∞ e−ρtΛtKt =0 .
Substituting for Ch







This is the no-shirking condition with constant marginal utility ofwealth, Λ t. It corresponds
to the Frisch labor supply curve in the standard growth model, and is referred to as the Frisch
NSC. The resource constraint (19) becomes
Ct + It = Yt, (26)
where Yt is given by (20).
Given the initial condition, K(0) = K0 > 0, an equilibrium is given by a set oftime paths,
{Ct,N t,I t,Y t,W t,R t,Λt,K t}, that satisfy the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (22)-(24), the
factor-demand equations (14)-(15), the Frisch NSC (25), the resource constraints (20), (26), and
the transversality condition.
From those equilibrium conditions it immediately follows that our model with full income
insurance is isomorphic to the one-sector growth model in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) with
the instantaneous utility function which is linear in leisure:
ln(Ct)+B(T − ehNt)
7This equivalence result is shown by Alexopoulos (2002), but we repeat it here for completeness.
10where B =
χ−1
(1−s)χ. Thus, using the result ofBenhabib and Farmer (1994), unless the labor
demand curve is upward sloping, the steady state is a saddle point and (locally) determinate.
That is, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the model with full income insurance to exhibit
the saddle path stability is that
(1 + η)(1 − α) < 1. (27)
3.2 Partial Insurance
Let us turn to the case ofpartial income insurance, σ<1. As we shall see below, the crucial
property ofthis case is that the Frisch NSC is downward sloping. The possibility that indetermi-
nacy be caused by a downward sloping Frisch labor supply curve is emphasized by Bennett and
Farmer (2000). As shown by Hintermaier (2003) and Nakajima (2001), however, when utility is
concave in consumption and leisure, the Frisch labor supply curve cannot be downward sloping,
which excludes the mechanism proposed by Bennett and Farmer (2002) in the standard growth
model. Here, the utility function is strictly concave in consumption and leisure, but indetermi-
nacy is generated by a downward sloping Frisch NSC, which is possible as long as unemployment
insurance is imperfect.
3.2.1 Equilibrium conditions
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the household’s problem are, again, given by (21)-(23). Since
Ct = µCu
t , however, (21) is now rewritten as





The lef t-hand side ofthis equation is the average marginal utility ofconsumption in the house-
hold. Note that it is decreasing in the employment, Nt. Because under the partial income
insurance, unemployed individuals consume less than employed individuals, Cu
t = Ct/ µ<C t,
the marginal utility ofconsumption ofan unemployed individual is greater than that ofan
employed individual, Uc(Ct,e t) <U c(Cu
t ,0). Hence, given Ct, when Nt goes up, the average
marginal utility ofthe household goes down.









Thus, the Frisch NSC is downward sloping: keeping marginal utility ofwealth, Λ t, constant, this
implies an inverse relationship between the wage rate Wt and the employment Nt. To see this,
11suppose the employment, Nt, goes up with Λt kept constant. As we have seen, this tends to
decrease the average marginal utility ofconsumption in the household. With Λ t kept constant,
this tends to reduce Ct and thus Ch
t . By the no-shirking condition (17), this, in turn, leads to
a decrease in the wage rate, Wt.




1+( µ − 1)Nt

Ct + It = Yt, (30)
where Yt is given by (20).
A dynamic equilibrium in the partial insurance case is given by {Ct,N t,I t,Y t,W t,R t,Λt,K t}
that satisfy the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (22)-(23) and (28), the factor-demand equa-
tions (14)-(15), the Frisch NSC (29), the resource constraints (20) and (30), and the transver-
sality condition.
3.2.2 Linearization
For a variable Xt, let X denote its steady-state level, xt ≡ ln(Xt), and ˆ xt ≡ ln(Xt) − ln(X).
Then the equilibrium conditions above are log-linearized as
−
(µ − 1)N
µ − (µ − 1)N
ˆ nt − ˆ ct = ˆ λt,
ˆ wt = −
(µ − 1)N
µ − (µ − 1)N
ˆ nt − ˆ λt, (31)
SC
(µ − 1)N
1+( µ − 1)N
ˆ nt + SCˆ ct + SIˆ it =ˆ yt,
ˆ wt =ˆ yt − ˆ nt, (32)
ˆ rt =ˆ yt − ˆ kt,
ˆ yt = aˆ kt + bˆ nt, (33)
˙ λt = −(ρ + δ)ˆ rt, (34)
˙ kt = δˆ it − δˆ kt, (35)
where SC and SI are the steady-state shares ofconsumption and investment, respectively.
Using (31)-(33), the equilibrium employment, ˆ nt, is written as






µ − (µ − 1)N
.




µ − (µ − 1)N
<b− 1. (37)
The lef t-hand side ofthis equation is the slope ofthe Frisch NSC (31), and is non-positive. It
is zero when µ = 1, and, as µ →∞ , declines monotonically to −N/(1 − N) < 0. Thus, the
greater µ is the steeper the Frisch NSC is. In other words, the Frisch NSC becomes steeper
with less income insurance (remember that µ = Ct/Cu
t ). This is because the eﬀect of Nt on the
average marginal utility ofconsumption is larger with a greater µ. The right-hand of(37) is
the slope ofthe labor demand curve, which is negative when externalities are small, i.e., when
(27) is satisﬁed. Condition (37) says that employment Nt responds to Λt inversely ifand only if
the Frisch NSC is steeper than the labor demand curve. It is more likely to occur when income
insurance is less.
From (33) and (36), it follows that ˆ yt satisﬁes
ˆ yt = ykˆ kt + yλˆ λt, (38)
where
yk ≡ a(1 + bnλ), and yλ ≡ bnλ.
We can then show that ˙ kt and ˙ λt satisfy the system of ODE’s given by






1+( µ − 1)N
− 1







1+( µ − 1)N

ˆ λt, (39)
˙ λt = −(ρ + δ)(yk − 1)ˆ kt − (ρ + δ)yλˆ λt. (40)
Since k is a predetermined variable and λ is a jump variable, local indeterminacy requires that
both eigenvalues ofthe matrix associated with the system (39)-(40) be negative. Equivalently,
for local indeterminacy, the trace should be negative and the determinant must be positive. It
is straightforward calculation to show that the determinant is given by
DET =
δ(ρ + δ)
1+( µ − 1)N
SC
SI
nλ(a − 1). (41)
13As long as we are interested in the case ofmoderate externalities so that a−1=α(1+η)−1 < 0,
the sign ofthe determinant is positive ifand only if nλ < 0, that is, ifand only ifthe Frisch
NSC is steepr than the labor demand curve. The trace is shown to equal
TR = nλ(1 − N)

(1 − N)µ + N

(Nµ+1− N)Γ, (42)
where Γ is the quadratic equation in µ given by
Γ=δ(1 − a)(2N − 1)

N(1 − N)µ2 +( 2 N2 − 2N +1 ) µ + N(1 − N)

− δ(1 − a)











(1 − N)2µ2 +( 1− N)(2N2 − 2N +1 ) µ +( 1− N)2

With our parameter values in the calibration exercise below, the trace has the same sign as nλ.
3.2.3 Interpretation
As shown in the previous subsection, the determinacy ofequilibrium depends on the sign of
nλ. For simplicity, suppose that there are no externalities (a + b = 1). Then the determinant
ofthe ODE system (39)-(40) is positive ifand only if nλ < 0, that is, ifand only ifhigher
marginal utility ofwealth reduces employment and output. This corresponds to the earlier work
on indeterminacy. For example, in Benhabib and Farmer (1994), when externalities are strong
enough so that the labor demand curve is upward sloping and steeper than the labor supply
curve, higher marginal utility ofwealth reduces labor and output by shif ting down the Frisch
labor supply curve. Also, in Benhabib and Farmer (1996), when sector speciﬁc externalities
are strong enough, higher marginal utility ofwealth shif ts up the Frisch labor supply curve;
therefore, even when the labor demand curve is downward sloping, higher marginal utility of
wealth results in lower employment and output.
In our model, nλ < 0 ifand only ifthe Frisch NSC is steeper than the labor demand curve.
In such a case, higher marginal utility ofwealth shif ts down the Frisch NSC, but employment,
and hence output, goes down. This is why indeterminacy is possible in our model without
externalities. Also, note that the Frisch NSC gets steeper with a high µ, that is, with higher
inequality in consumption between the employed and the unemployed. Thus, higher inequality
(less risk sharing) makes indeterminacy more likely to occur.
143.3 Calibration





Here we directly calibrate µ and N instead ofassigning values to parameters such as θ, ξ, d, s,
T, and h. Equations (16) and (18) show how µ depends on those underlying parameters. The
(ranges of) values of the above parameters used in this paper are listed in Table 1. There, the
values of ρ, δ, α, SC and SI are taken from Benhabib and Farmer (1996), and the value of N is
from Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2000).
With those parameter values, we can use (42) to show that the trace ofthe matrix associated
with (39)-(40) has the same sign as nλ. Hence, when nλ < 0, the trace is negative and the
determinant is positive—the condition for local indeterminacy is satisﬁed.
Since nλ < 0 is equivalent to the condition that the Frisch NSC is steeper than the labor
demand curve, it is more likely to occur with less income insurance (large µ) or larger externalities
(high η). Deﬁne µ∗(η) be the critical value of µ above which equilibrium is indeterminate:
µ∗(η) ≡ inf

µ : nλ < 0

.
Assuming N>(1−(1−α)(1+η))/(2−(1−α)(1+η))), which is satisﬁed for the values listed
in Table 1, we can write µ∗(η)a s
µ∗(η)=
(2 − (1 − α)(1 + η))N
(2 − (1 − α)(1 + η))N − 1+( 1− α)(1 + η)
.





(1 + α)N − α
≈ 1.33.
Thus, as long as µ>1.33, equilibrium is indeterminate without externalities. In other words,
indeterminacy obtains ifthe consumption ofan unemployed is less than 75 percent ofthat ofan
employed. Based on Gruber (1997), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2000) set this value to
1.285 (the consumption ofan unemployed is about 78 percent ofthat ofan employed). Given
such evidence, the requirement that µ>1.33 does not seem unrealistic.
154 ConcludingRemarks
Using an eﬃciency-wage model ofAlexopoulos (2002), we have considered the relationship be-
tween the likelihood ofindeterminacy and the degree ofunemployment insurance coverage. It
is shown that the less unemployment insurance is, the more likely indeterminacy is to obtain.
Equilibrium can be indeterminate even without externalities or increasing returns, which makes
a sharp contrast to the models ofsunspots such as Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Ben-
habib and Nishimura (1998), Farmer and Guo (1994), Perli (1998), Wen (1998), and Barinci
and Ch´ eron (2001). Our result is based on the fact that the Frisch no-shirking condition is
downward sloping when income insurance is not perfect. In this sense, it is related to Bennett
and Farmer (2000).
In the simple setup in this paper, sunspot shocks generate countercyclical consumption
without strong externalities, which is inconsistent with the stylized facts of the business cycle.
This may be overcome in diﬀerent ways. In Nakajima (2003), we develop a business cycle model
with variable capacity utilization to pursue such a direction.
5 Appendix
In this appendix, we consider a class ofinstantaneous utility f unctions which is slightly more




(T − ξ − he)1−γ. (A1)
This will only change the expressions for the no-shirking levels of χ = Ct/Cs
t and e. Let χ(Wt)
be
χ(Wt)=
hWt − Ft + Ch
t
shWt − Ft + Ch
t
.
With the instantaneous utility function (A1), the incentive compatibility constraint (12) leads
to










The Solow condition e (Wt)Wt = e(Wt) implies that χ is a constant deﬁned implicitly by


















16Given χ, the incentive-compatible level ofeﬀort, e, is given by









The rest ofanalysis goes exactly like the one in the main text.
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Figure 1: Conditions on µ and η for indeterminacy
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